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Abstract 
Motivated reasoning bias and its manifestation in confirmation bias make it unlikely that people 
will change their minds on matters for which their positions are expressions of their own or their 
group’s identity. Moral scenarios serve as a useful proxy for evaluating motivated reasoning 
because moral positions often comprise major components of individual and group identity. 
While many interventions to overcome these cognitive deficits have been tried, they have had 
only limited success and suffer from the problem of failure in domain transfer. Previous research 
has identified a subset of individuals who demonstrate a greater than average immunity to 
cognitive biases. However, characteristics associated with this reduction in susceptibility have 
yet to be identified. The goal of the present study was two-fold: 1) to validate an economic game 
approach for measuring changes in moral reasoning and 2) to examine cognitive behavioral 
covariates, namely, openminded thinking and moral foundations, associated with performance. 
This approach used an economic game in which participants spent money to reward or punish 
scenario actors for their moral actions. The scenarios were divided into six epochs of 
increasing/new information. Following each epoch, participants rendered a judgment based on 
the information available to them at the time, and changes from previous judgments were 
measured. Results revealed that thinking in monetary terms significantly changed moral 
judgments. Open-mindedness was highly correlated with moral foundations and political 
identity. Each of these predicted reversals in judgment, though in surprising directions. The 
results suggest that participants who are politically conservative and less openminded reverse 
their positions more often than more open-minded, politically liberal participants.  
 Keywords: Motivated reasoning bias, confirmation bias, cognitive biases, economic game
 1 
Measuring Individual Differences and Changes in Moral Reasoning: 
 
An Economic Game Approach 
Human beings are biased thinkers. Our biases have been diligently and precisely 
uncovered and catalogued (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 
Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). While adaptive in many 
contexts, these biases can be disastrous in certain situations. Corrections for these biases have 
proved difficult to discover. Many interventions have been developed and tested experimentally 
to quantify their effectiveness, though the ameliorative effects are often small, unlasting, and do 
not transfer well to other domains. Some studies of performance in everyday reasoning have 
uncovered effects of training and expertise in reasoning (Kuhn, 1991). A key difference here is 
whether the reasoning under examination is motivated or unmotivated reasoning. In motivated 
reasoning, an individual is motivated to reach or defend a specific conclusion. When reasoning is 
not motivated, there is no desire to reach one conclusion over another. Training in reasoning is 
associated with expert performance in unmotivated but not motivated reasoning tasks (Kahan, 
2017; Kuhn, 1991). Motivated reasoning activates certain biases, resistance to which is not much 
improved by training, but is predicted by certain cognitive tests and attributes discussed below. 
Here we examine a novel measure of cognitive performance and resistance to bias; namely, the 
ability to change one’s mind. We measured this ability in multiple ways and assessed its 
association with traits proposed to predict cognitive performance in order to assess whether these 
traits offer any advantage in combating motivated reasoning biases. Finally, we compared 
performance on the experimental tasks in two conditions: an economic game condition in which 
judgments were made monetarily, and a control condition with non-monetary judgments.  
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Biases and Heuristics  
Among our most powerful and pernicious biases are those belonging to the class of 
motivated reasoning biases (Kunda, 1990). Perhaps the most well-known of these, confirmation 
bias (Nickerson, 1998) (sometimes termed myside bias), is the tendency to seek out evidence 
confirming one’s beliefs, avoid evidence contradiction one’s beliefs, and to give more credence 
to confirming than disconfirming evidence. Confirmation bias is known to be exacerbated, rather 
than ameliorated, as individual facility with numerical data increases (Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & 
Slovic, 2017). This is consistent with other findings showing that rationality and intelligence are 
not the same thing and may not only stand apart, but also be antithetical (Mercier & Sperber, 
2011, Stanovich, 2012). Performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks that assess bias like 
confirmation bias is poorly correlated with measures of general intelligence like IQ (Stanovich & 
West, 2008a). Cognitive ability does not, for example, predict susceptibility to confirmation bias, 
one-sided thinking bias, (Stanovich & West, 2008b) or bias blind spot (West, Meserve, & 
Stanovich, 2012). Performance on these tasks is, however, correlated with so-called thinking 
dispositions such as need for cognition and actively open-minded thinking (Kokis, Macpherson, 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 
2008). More predictive still is performance on cognitive tests like the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT, Frederick, 2005) that require the suppression of automatic, fast, System One responses in 
order to facilitate deliberative, slower, System Two responses (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 
Toplak, & West, 2008).  
Syllogistic tests demonstrate this in two ways. First are valid but obviously unsound 
arguments; that is, arguments in which the conclusion logically follows from the premises but in 
which one or more of the premises is known to be false. Prior beliefs here bias one toward 
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rejecting the argument as unsound, even if one is explicitly instructed to accept the truth of the 
premises for the purpose of the test. Such an argument might take the form: 
P1: All mammals have hair 
P2: Some birds are mammals 
C: ∴ Some birds have hair 
This argument is unsound—P2 is untrue—but logically valid, and recognizing its validity 
requires the ability to reason logically when logic conflicts with one’s prior beliefs (Toplak et al., 
2011).  
Second are invalid arguments that use known-to-be-true or believed-be-true premises and 
conclusions. Again, as a standard form categorical syllogism, we formulate the argument: 
P1: All dogs have hair 
P2: All German Shepherds have hair 
C: ∴ All German Shepherds are dogs 
The logic of this argument is invalid; the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Seeing 
this again requires the ability to reason logically—here recognizing a logical fallacy—when the 
fallacious conclusion and the premises are all consistent with one’s prior beliefs. Standard form 
categorical syllogisms can take 256 forms only 15 of which are valid (Copi, Cohen, & 
McMahon, 2016). This argument takes the form AAA-2. The two premises and conclusion are 
universal (All dogs and all German Shepherds). The similarly formed Barbara syllogism has the 
valid form AAA-1. The difference is in the positioning of the middle term “hair.” The invalid 
German Shepherd argument takes the skeleton: 
All P have M. 
All S have M. 
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∴ All S are P 
where P = predicate term, S = subject term, and M = middle term. The valid Barbara form takes 
the skeleton: 
All M is P. 
All S is M. 
∴ All S is P.   
The only formal difference is the placement of the middle term. In the Barbara form, the 
German Shepherd argument is:  
P1: All animals with hair are German Shepherds. 
P2: All dogs are animals with hair. 
C: ∴ All dogs are German Shepherds.  
Here again is a logically valid but unsound argument: it is formally correct—the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the premises—but its premises are untrue. Thus, misleading arguments 
are easily made by placing false premises into valid forms and by placing true premises into 
invalid forms.  
In addition to esoteric and technical biases and heuristics like ignoring base rates 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and failures of numeracy in data interpretation (Kahan, Peters, 
Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman, & Mandel, 2012; Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, 
& Dickert, 2006), there are more common failures of everyday reasoning that demonstrate the 
real-world implications of the cognitive failures demonstrated by heuristics-and-biases tests 
(Hilton, 2003; Reyna & Farley, 2006; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006; Sunstein, 2005). Among others, 
these include failure to conceive of evidence for one’s view (as opposed to pseudoevidence), of 
evidence against one’s view, of an alternative theory, of a counterargument, failure to rebut an 
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alternative theory or counterargument, and failure to recognize and reject pseudoevidence (Kuhn, 
1991). 
Rationality  
Humans are biased, but the question remains whether human beings are irrationally or 
rationally biased thinkers. Despite the decline of the rationalist model (Clark, 2008; Haidt, 2001) 
popular among mid-twentieth century cognitive psychologists, and the now in vogue social 
intuitionist theory popularized by Haidt (2001), the heuristics and biases literature remains 
surprisingly controversial (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Klein, 1999). The social intuitionist theory 
is a theory of specifically moral judgment which holds that moral judgments are the result of 
intuitions which conform to group identity—an historically adaptive trait for moral animals 
whose survival is determined both by the wellbeing of the group and one’s place within it. 
Evidence and reasons supporting moral judgments are post hoc; however, thinkers are typically 
oblivious to this and believe the process to have occurred in the reverse direction (Haidt, 2012a; 
Haidt & Björklund, 2008). The opposing camps on the question of rational or irrational bias as 
parsed by Stanovich (1999) are the Panglossian, Meliorist, and Apologist positions. What 
distinguishes them is the way in which they construe the relationship between normative, 
prescriptive, and descriptive models of rationality. On one extreme is the Panglossian position, 
which sees no distance between the three models of rationality; in other words, humans are 
rational. There is thus no distinction to be made between a descriptive model of human 
rationality and a normative model, and hence no need of a prescriptive model to bridge any such 
gap. By contrast, the Meliorist and Apologist positions see a large gap between normative and 
descriptive models and hence find that humans are irrational. What distinguishes these views is 
where they place the prescriptive model along a continuum. For instance, the Meliorist position 
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is pessimistic about how much can be done to optimize human rationality, so its prescriptive 
model is much closer to the normative model than the descriptive model, leaving little room for 
improvement. By contrast, the Apologist position is optimistic about optimizing human 
rationality, so its prescriptive model starts at the descriptive model, leaving much room for 
improvement.  
All three approaches hold humans to be biased. The Panglossian approach takes humans 
to be rationally biased; Meliorists and Apologists hold humans to be irrationally biased. 
Panglossians see cognitive biases as adaptive traits—evolutionary artifacts that are sometimes 
anachronistic, but which more often remain adaptive. The Panglossian position need not hold 
that the biases and heuristics humans rely upon are universally adaptive. More parsimoniously, 
one can hold that while these reasoning strategies were once adaptive and often still are, they can 
be misleading and maladaptive today. This is especially so in societies where survival is not 
largely dependent on group membership and where societies and groups themselves are so large 
as to hold conflicting positions on many issues.  
 The biases and heuristics literature has seldom intersected with the social intuitionist 
model and other decision-making research in social psychology (see Kuhn, 1991 and Kunda, 
1990 for exceptions). However, if Haidt’s social intuitionist model is correct, the implications for 
the previously established positions are potentially significant. The heuristics and biases 
literature is almost exclusively concerned with thinking biases; that is, failures to demonstrate 
optimal reasoning on what are more or less logic puzzles. The strongest objection to this method 
of testing, and the argument that has proved so fruitful for the Panglossians, is that performance 
on logic puzzles is neither adaptive nor more than rarely useful, and hence a poor, if not 
irrelevant, measure of rationality (Stanovich, 1999). More relevant are tests of everyday 
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reasoning (Kuhn, 1991) in matters where one is motivated to reach a certain conclusion (Haidt, 
2001; Kunda, 1990).  
Debiasing Strategies  
Many debiasing strategies and interventions have been studied, but these have generally 
shown meager and temporary results (Aczel, Bago, Szollosi, Foldes, & Lukacs, 2015). 
Awareness of biases and heuristics is insufficient to surmount them (Babcock & Loewenstein, 
1997; Fishhoff, 1981), and training in statistics (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Nisbett, Krantz, 
Jepson, & Kunda, 1983) and critical thinking (Baron, 2000; Ennis, 1991; Niu, Behar-Horenstein, 
& Garvan, 2013; Willingham, 2008;) suffer from the problem of domain transfer (Cheng, 
Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver 1986; Fong & Nisbett, 1991). People can learn the difference 
between modus ponens and modus tollens or the law of large numbers, for example, but cannot 
apply that knowledge outside of the context in which it was learned. Some have made headway 
against the domain transfer problem with analogical reasoning (Aczel et al., 2015; Vendetti, Wu, 
& Holyoak, 2014); however, improvements are limited and fail to persist.  
The human factors approach to debiasing seeks to overcome cognitive failures by 
changing the environment rather than the user. It is applied in behavioral economics and 
judgment and decision-making research (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The use of visual aids in 
communicating medical information is one such example (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2011, 
2013). This is a useful approach; however, it requires human factors psychologists and decision 
scientists to remake the world. That is a tremendous undertaking, and yet not all the world is 
accessible to these decision scientists. In the realm of national security intelligence analysis, for 
example, decision scientists could surely make improvements. However, it is not possible for all 
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classified intelligence products to be vetted by psychologists; nor is it possible for all intelligence 
professionals to become human factors experts.  
The human factors approach makes no attempt to uncover the biological causes of 
cognitive failures and cannot offer a way to correct them at the source. Biological explanations 
for cognitive failures and differences in reasoning, on the other hand, have flourished (Bryant, 
Deardeuff, Zoccoli, & Nam, 2016; De Sousa, 2008; Osherson et al., 1998; Westen, Blagov, 
Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). We contend that these efforts to reveal the ultimate causes of 
cognitive failures offer the best hope of correcting those failures. Here we sought to identify and 
describe individuals who already demonstrate expertise in reasoning as a precursor to biological 
work.  
Individual Differences in Rationality  
A number of studies have shown that there are significant individual differences in 
rationality (Stanovich, 1999); some people have demonstrated perfect reasoning on impersonal 
and presumably unmotivating subjects (Kuhn, 1991). The expert reasoners identified by Kuhn 
were graduate philosophy students. They were questioned on three topics: recidivism, school 
failure, and unemployment. They were not asked such motivating questions as, for example, 
“Why did the Journal of Philosophy reject your last article?” The goal of the present study was 
to identify traits of individuals demonstrating one aspect of optimal reasoning, the ability to 
change one’s mind, on questions designed to evoke motivated responses. To do this, we designed 
an economic game that drew on game theoretical approaches (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) to 
examine whether and what individual differences correlate with and predict resistance to bias in 
motivated reasoning. Moral scenarios and dilemmas served as a proxy for questions involving 
motivated reasoning since most moral positions have a place in one’s own and one’s group’s 
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identity (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). The following main effects 
were hypothesized: Susceptibility to motivated reasoning biases as marked by inability to change 
one’s mind would correlate with less openminded thinking, five-foundation morality and 
political conservatism. Conversely, resistance to bias in motivated reasoning would correlate 
with open-mindedness, two-foundation morality, and political liberalism.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were 112 Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) basic users who responded to a 
listing soliciting participants for a moral thinking experiment. Participants were predominantly 
males (63%) and ranged in age from 18 to 69 (M = 34.32, SD = 10.537) (Table 1). All 
participants consented to participate in the research at the beginning of the experiment using an 
online unsigned consent form approved by the institutional review board and were paid $5 for 
their participation.  
Procedure 
 All participants answered a four-item questionnaire to indicate moral positions on one to 
four topics: the role of free will in moral culpability, use of animal products, insurance coverage 
for transitioning surgeries, and the amputation of a healthy limb for a person with body integrity 
identity disorder. Participants then completed the moral reasoning task followed by three self-
report questionnaires.  
Assessments. 
Moral reasoning task. In this task, participants were presented with one of four 
scenarios. Each scenario was designed to change the participants’ minds on an issue by 
presenting evidence and arguments supporting an alternate position from their own. Scenarios 
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were designed to extend the logic of one of the initial four positions to what would be an 
uncomfortable but logically consistent conclusion. Participants who indicated they strongly 
agreed that free will was required for moral culpability entered a scenario in which arguments 
against free will were presented as leading to the conclusion that culpability is therefore 
incoherent. Participants who indicated they were in favor of equality but for or indifferent to the 
use of animal products proceeded to a scenario in which arguments for extending the principle of 
equality beyond arbitrary distinctions (sex, race, etc.) were extended to non-human sentients. 
Participants who indicated they were opposed to discrimination against transgender persons 
proceeded to a scenario in which a transgender woman tells her fiancée that she was born with 
male genitalia. Participants who indicated they supported health insurance coverage of 
transgender sex reassignment surgery proceeded to a scenario in which an individual with body 
integrity identity disorder (BIID) undergoes an amputation of an otherwise healthy limb in order 
to bring physical identity into congruency with felt sense of self.  
In order to induce motivated moral cognitions related to group identity, we developed the 
former two scenarios for conservative participants and the latter two scenarios for liberal 
participants. Since scenario assignment was made on the basis of responses to the initial moral 
positions questionnaire, the number of participants in each scenario was unequal.   
Each scenario provided background information followed by a description of the 
character’s action. Participants were asked to render a moral judgment of the character in the 
scenario. This initial judgement was then followed by five additional rounds of additional 
arguments with a new judgment requested subsequent to each. This resulted in a total of six 
judgements from each participant. 
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 One aim of this study was to evaluate an economic game as a tool for measuring changes 
of mind in moral judgments. Thus, study participants were divided into two groups: control and 
treatment. Participants were recruited through two different study announcements on Amazon 
Turk and assigned to treatment or control groups based on the study announcement to which they 
responded. In the treatment condition (n = 63) participants played an economic game in which 
they chose to reward or punish the scenario character for their actions by spending notional 
money in $10 increments. Participants also had the option to withhold judgment by refraining 
from spending any money. Over the six rounds, each participant had the opportunity to 
maximally punish or reward a character by spending $60. After the sixth judgment, participants 
were again issued $60 of notional money and indicated their final judgment by spending any 
amount ranging from $0 to $60 to abstain from judgment or punish/reward, respectively.  
In the control condition (n = 49), participants responded to the same scenarios but did not 
play the economic game. Instead, they indicated their moral judgment on a 3-point Likert scale 
in which -1 indicated punishment, 0 indicated abstain, and +1 indicated reward.   
Actively Openminded Thinking Scale. The AOT (Stanovich & West, 1997) is a multi-
item questionnaire including several subscales designed to assess openness and flexibility in 
thinking style. Scores are calculated as difference scores in which the summed totals of the 
absolutism, dogmatism, and categorical thinking scales are subtracted from the summed totals of 
the flexible thinking, openness-ideas, and openness-values scales such that higher scores indicate 
greater openmindedness.  
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. The MFQ30 (Haidt, 2012b) consists of 30 items 
assessing five moral foundations: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Work by Haidt (2012b) has correlated two-
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foundation morality with political liberalism and five-foundation morality with political 
conservatism. In two-foundation morality, care/harm and fairness/cheating are more valued than 
the other three foundations. In five-foundation morality, all five foundations are valued 
approximately equally. To determine if participants’ values were two- or five-foundation, we 
calculated difference scores by subtracting the loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/subversion summed scores from the summed totals for care/harm and fairness/cheating 
such that more positive scores indicated two-foundation morality, and more negative scores 
indicated five-foundation morality.  
Demographics. The demographics questionnaire was designed to provide additional 
information about study participants for post hoc analyses and included items addressing 
political affiliation, political ideology, and education level, among others.  
Results 
 
 Using an Economic Game as a Measure of Moral Judgment 
 Self-report data. Data indicated that the control and treatment groups did not differ in 
age, sex, or education level. However, the two groups did significantly differ in the 3 trait 
measures assessing open-mindedness, moral foundations, and political identity (Table 1). 
Specifically, participants in the control group were more politically conservative, less 
openminded, and more likely to have a five-foundation morality.  
 Moral Reasoning task performance. Task performance was operationalized using two 
metrics: number of changes and number of reversals. The number of changes represents the 
number of times the participant switched from one judgment (reward, abstain, or punish) to 
another over the course of the scenario. The number of reversals represents the number of times 
the judgment of reward or punish changes to its opposite (ignoring abstentions). Of these two 
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outcomes, the groups differed only on the mean number of reversals (See Table 2) such that the 
control group had more reversals on average than the economic game group. This finding did not 
persist after controlling for the differences in the trait measures between the groups, F(4, 80) = 
3.00, p = .09.   
Traits associated with moral reasoning performance. Consistent with previous literature, we 
examined the correlations between the three trait measures: AOT, MFQ30, and political identity 
(see Table 3). AOT was correlated with MFQ30, r(83) = .72, p < .001 and political identity 
r(110) = -.51, p < .001 with participants high in AOT also associated with a two-foundation 
morality and left-of-center political identity. Participants low in AOT were also associated with a 
five-foundation morality and identified as politically right-of-center. Participants with a two-
foundation morality valued care and fairness more than the other three foundations: loyalty, 
sanctity, and authority. Participants with a five-foundation morality valued all five foundations 
approximately equally. Political identity was correlated with moral foundations r(83) = -.67, p < 
.001 such that participants who were politically left-of-center were associated with a two-
foundation morality and participants politically right-of-center were associated with a five-
foundation morality.  
Multiple regression was used to examine AOT, moral foundations, and political identity 
as predictors of both the number of changes and reversals (see Table 4). AOT significantly 
predicted reversals,  = -.28, t(110) = -3.10, p = .002 such that participants high in AOT made 
less reversals on average. Moral foundations also significantly predicted reversals,  = -.22, t(83) 
= -2.08, p = .04 such that participants with a two-foundation morality made less reversals. 
Participants who scored lower in open-mindedness and who demonstrated a five-foundation 
morality changed their minds (reversals) more often than more openminded and two-foundation 
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participants, respectively. Despite the high correlations between our three trait measures of 
interest, AOT, moral foundations, and political identity, there was not a significant difference in 
the number of reversals made between politically left-of-center and right-of-center participants; 
however, this difference was detected in analyses of the whole sample below. 
Subset analyses. Since our primary interest was in identifying and understanding people 
who can change their minds, we recast the analyses by grouping participants as those who made 
changes and those who did not. We then looked for patterns of variation in trait measures among 
only those participants who demonstrated the ability to change their minds (See Table 5). In this 
subset, AOT was the sole measure that significantly predicted reversals,  = -.02, t(57) = -3.00, p 
= .004. Again, participants who scored lower in AOT made more reversals than participants who 
scored higher in AOT.  
 Since the most common response across all scenarios and both treatment and control 
groups was to make no changes in judgement throughout the scenarios, we conducted a series of 
logistic regression models to identify whether AOT, moral foundations, and political identity 
were predictive of whether participants made any changes or any reversals (See Table 6). AOT 
significantly differentiated reversal behavior. The estimated odds of making at least one reversal 
were decreased among those with high AOT (OR=  p = .03, R2 = .043, adj.  R2 = .07). 
Political identity also predicted reversals such that participants who identified as right-of-center 
had increased odds of making one or more reversals in judgement in comparison to those 
identifying as left-of-center (OR = 1.27, p = 0.047, R2 = .035, adj.  R2 = .057). Moral foundations 
did not predict reversals in this analysis, and no trait measure predicted changes.  
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Discussion 
Moral Econ Game 
Independent samples were taken for control and treatment groups, yet analyses revealed 
these to be heterogenous groups. In ANOVAs measuring these groups on the independent trait 
variables, the groups were significantly different on AOT, F(1, 110) = 14.11, p < 0.001, with the 
treatment group scoring higher in AOT. The groups were also heterogeneous on independent 
variables highly correlated with AOT, namely moral foundations, F(1, 83) = 9.75, p = 0.002, and 
political identity, F(1, 110) = 5.585, p = 0.020, with the treatment group tending toward a two-
foundation morality and a left-of-center political identity.  
The control and treatment groups also differed by number of reversals made. To validate 
the economic game as a proxy for measuring shifts in moral judgment, we conducted an 
ANCOVA and compared the dependent variable reversals from each group (treatment and 
control) while controlling for trait covariates (AOT, moral foundations, and political identity) 
and found no significant difference between the groups, F(4, 80) = 3.00, p = .09). 
This suggests that thinking in monetary terms did not significantly alter the moral 
judgments participants made during the experimental scenarios. For this reason, the economic 
game may be an impartial measure of changes in moral reasonings—at least in the types of 
personal scenarios used in this experiment. Whether thinking in monetary terms effects other 
types of moral reasoning, such as impersonal moral dilemmas, requires further investigation. 
Since changes of mind are rare, and reversals are rarer, examining the ways in which thinking in 
monetary terms differentially affects distinct trait differences like cognitive style will require 
future studies with much larger sample sizes. 
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Individual Differences in Changing One’s Mind 
 We set out to identify individuals who have increased facility with changing their minds 
in response to evidence and then measure how these individuals differed by likely covariates. 
These included actively open-minded thinking (AOT), moral foundations, and political identity. 
Consistent with previous research, these traits were highly correlated for participants in our 
samples such that participants high in AOT had a two-foundation morality and were politically 
left-of-center on average. We hypothesized that participants high in AOT, who had a two-
foundation morality, and hence valued care and equality more than they valued loyalty, sanctity, 
and authority, would change their minds more often and reverse their judgments more often. 
Instead, we found that participants lower in AOT and who identified as politically right-of-center 
had more reversals on average.  
None of the traits we examined predicted whether participants made changes, as distinct 
from reversals. That is likely because the majority of respondents did not deviate from their 
original judgment throughout the experiment. This left a small sample of individuals who made 
any changes, and an even smaller sample that made reversals. This is consistent with the 
phenomenon under examination. Changing one’s mind on a moral issue merely in response to 
evidence is not common (Haidt, 2012b).  
AOT and moral foundations predicted likelihood of reversals in regression analyses. 
Given that most respondents made no changes in their judgments, we conducted subset analyses 
to discover if the trait variables of interest could predict who would make reversals among only 
those participants who made changes. AOT predicted number of reversals in this subgroup. 
Surprisingly, however, among those who made changes, it was participants lower in AOT who 
made more reversals.  
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To further explore these results, we conducted logistic regressions on the subset of 
participants who made changes to discover if the traits also predicted who made reversals and 
who did not. AOT and political identity predicted who likely made reversals in this group. 
Participants low in AOT and politically right-of-center were again more likely to make reversals 
than their counterparts.  
These results are surprising and worth further exploration. One possible explanation for 
these results is the order in which the parts of the experiment were carried out. Participants began 
with one to four sorting questions in which they made moral judgments that determined which of 
the four scenarios into which they proceeded. They next completed a demographics 
questionnaire that included political identity. They then completed the main experiment—six 
iterations of scenario evidence and moral judgment. Finally, they completed the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire and the Actively Openminded Thinking Questionnaire. Given the 
high correlations among political identity, moral foundations, and AOT, it seems unlikely that 
question order is responsible for the results.  
Another possibility is that the intuition that traits like open-mindedness will predict 
changing one’s mind or reversing one’s mind is somehow incomplete or an instance of two 
things that do not relate to one another in the way in which we might expect. This might occur 
were it the case that openminded individuals were immediately convinced by the first of six 
arguments and hence only had their positions bolstered by the subsequent five pieces of 
evidence. Similarly, this could occur were it easier for openminded participants to change their 
minds at a single point, at any of the six opportunities, and then stick with that judgment. At the 
same time, or independently, such a relationship between these variables might hold if it was 
harder for less openminded individuals to change their positions, and they hence found 
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themselves oscillating—responding to the evidence but then reverting to their original judgment. 
Several analyses argue against these possibilities (See Table 7). We analyzed the patterns by 
which the six consecutive decisions were made. These fell into four categories: 1. No change 
was made, 2. The judgment was solidified, 3. The judgment was moderated, 4. No recognizable 
pattern. Trait variables were not predictive of any of these patterns. Openminded, politically left-
of-center participants were no more or less likely to waffle between judgments than less 
openminded, politically right-of-center participants.  
Another possibility is that there is a disconnect between the sort of questions asked in the 
Moral Foundations and Actively Openminded Thinking questionnaires and the questions asked 
in the scenarios in this experiment. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire, for example, asks 
questions like “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the 
following considerations relevant to your thinking: Whether or not someone suffered 
emotionally?, Whether or not some people were treated differently than others?, Whether or not 
someone showed love for his or her country?, Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect 
for authority?, Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency?” (Haidt, 
2012b). These are abstract questions; there is no specific scenario presented, though the 
questions may call such scenarios to mind for the respondent. The Actively Openminded 
Thinking Scale is similar in this regard. Participants use a Likert scale to indicate agreement or 
disagreement with statements like the following: “I think there are many wrong ways, but only 
one right way, to almost anything, Changing your mind is a sign of weakness, Abandoning a 
previous belief is a sign of strong character, No one can talk me out of something I know is right, 
Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made against 
them” (Stanovich & West, 1997). One such possibility is that the general questions asked in 
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these questionnaires capture what people think of themselves and their overarching principles, 
whereas scenario driven questions may capture what people feel or would do in a more specific 
and salient matter.  
Judgments in our experiment, by contrast, were scenario based. Participants made 
decisions to abstain, punish, or reward specific characters in these scenarios for their actions. In 
the BIID scenario, for example, participants judged the rightness or wrongness of a surgeon’s 
decision to amputate an otherwise healthy limb of a BIID patient. In the free will scenario, 
participants decided whether to abstain, reward, or punish a judge for convicting a defendant 
despite evidence that the defendant did not have the freedom to do otherwise with respect to the 
crime. Scenarios such as these can be evaluated from different perspectives. While it might be 
expected that conservatives will side with the judge or that liberals will side with the defendant, 
it is easy to find conservative reasons for siding with the defendant and liberal reasons for siding 
with the judge. The same can be said of individual differences in AOT and moral foundations. 
More, one can be openminded in general, but less so with regard to a specific scenario.  
Another possible explanation for these results; namely, that right-of-center, five-
foundation, lower AOT participants showed more reversals than their counterparts, is that self-
identified conservatives were responding to stereotype threat—the phenomenon in which 
consciousness of a stereotype about oneself alters one’s behavior (Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
Support for this possibility comes in part from the ordering of questions; participants identified 
their place on the political spectrum just before each scenario. Something more is needed to 
make sense of why question order might manipulate responses in the scenarios but not responses 
to the Moral Foundations and Actively Openminded Thinking questionnaires. This may be due 
to differential effects of stereotype threat on responses to specific and personal scenario-driven 
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questions, and the impersonal, general questions asked in those questionnaires. Further research 
is required both to replicate the scenario-specific finding and to distinguish between these 
possible interpretations.  
We also set out to validate an economic game model as a tool for measuring changes in 
moral judgment. The challenge here was that thinking in monetary terms can alter certain 
cognitions, including the weighing of risks, rewards, and likelihoods. To use such a tool to 
measure changes in moral cognition, it was necessary to measure its use in a treatment group 
against the judgments of a control group in which participants did not use money to make moral 
judgments. To assess our groups for differences, we measured the outcome variables changes 
and reversals while controlling for group differences in trait measures (AOT, moral foundations, 
and political identity). Here we found no significant differences; participants in the treatment 
condition made no more or less reversals than participants in the control condition. Thus, 
monetary measures may be appropriate as a proxy for measuring moral judgments in at least 
some circumstances.  
This finding has limitations. In our scenarios, participants were restricted in the amount 
of money they could spend; namely, they could spend $10 to reward, $10 to punish, or they 
could abstain. Results may vary if participants are given the freedom to select the degree to 
which they would punish and the degree to which they would reward. Further, participants in this 
study spent notional currency. Spending one’s own money may alter this result. A future study 
might examine this intersection of monetary and moral thinking by issuing participants actual 
money and allowing them to spend it in the scenario. Alternatively, scenarios might be 
constructed to illuminate participants to the ways in which their tax dollars are presently spent, or 
could be alternatively spent, to punish and reward their fellow citizens for various behaviors. 
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These dollars, while not in hand, are in fact distributed to encourage and discourage various 
behaviors.  
Whereas previous studies, though few, have examined and attempted to predict who is 
rational, we chose to identify who can change one’s mind in response to evidence. This approach 
is limited in that we did not measure the reasons for which individuals changed their minds, or 
did not change their minds, and whether those changes were rational. In all four scenarios, it was 
possible for individuals who did not change their minds to behave rationally, and it was also 
possible for individuals who did change their minds to behave irrationally. Studies that have 
assessed the rationality of participants’ thinking have done so in one of two ways. The first is to 
conduct methodical interviews with a small number of participants. The second is to have many 
participants answer very few simple questions such as questions about base rates. Each of these 
approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages. With more resources, it is possible to 
conduct methodical interviews with complex questions with many participants. Such resources 
might also allow for examining both changes of mind and the rationale behind such changes.  
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